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1. INTRODUCTION
In a recent paper, [Bergemann et al. 2017a], we derive results about equilibrium
behavior in the first-price auction that hold across all common-prior information
structures. The purpose of this letter is to give an informal introduction into the
results. At the end we offer a brief discussion of related work.
For a given prior distribution over value profiles, we study what can happen for all
information structures specifying bidders’ information about their own and others’
values. For any value distribution, we identify a lower bound on the distribution
of winning bids in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance. In other words,
no matter what the true information structure is, the distribution of winning bids
must first-order stochastically dominate the bound that we describe. In addition,
when the prior distribution of values is symmetric, we construct an equilibrium
and an information structure in which this lower bound is attained. This minimum
winning-bid distribution therefore pins down the minimum amount of revenue that
can be generated by the auction in expectation. Moreover, the minimum winning-
bid distribution is attained in an efficient equilibrium. As a result, this equilibrium
also attains an upper bound on the expected surplus of the bidders, which is equal
to the maximum feasible surplus minus minimum revenue.
Let us give a brief intuition for how our bounds are obtained. If the distribution
of winning bids places too high of a probability on low bids, then some bidder
would find that a modest increase in their bid would result in a relatively large
increase in the probability of winning, so that such a deviation would be attractive.
For example, it cannot be that all bidders tie with a bid of zero with probability
one, for then some bidder could increase his bid a token positive amount and win
the auction outright. This suggests that the relevant constraints for pinning down
minimum bidding are those associated with deviating to higher bids. Indeed, we
show that the minimum winning-bid distribution is characterized by bidders being
indifferent to all upward deviations.
To characterize the minimum, it turns out to be sufficient to look at a relatively
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small class of such deviations: For some bid b, we say that a bidder uniformly
deviates up to b if he switches to bidding b whenever he would have bid less than b
in equilibrium. It is clearly necessary for equilibrium that the bidders should not
want to uniformly deviate upward. Moreover, it turns out that the change in a
bidder’s surplus from a uniform upward deviation depends only on the distribution
of winning bids, and not on the distribution of losing bids. This motivates a relaxed
program in which we minimize the distribution of winning bids, subject only to the
uniform upward incentive constraints. The solution to this relaxed program gives
us a lower bound on the winning-bid distribution. We illustrate this proof strategy
with an example in which there are two bidders and a uniformly distributed common
value.
2. MODEL
We consider the sale of a single unit of a good by a first-price auction. There are
N individuals who bid for the good, indexed by i ∈ N = {1, . . . , N}, each of whom
has a value which lies in the compact interval V = [v, v] ⊂ R+. The bidders are
assumed to be risk neutral and to have quasilinear preferences over the allocation





. Each individual i ∈ N submits a bid bi ∈ B = [0, v], and the winner
is selected uniformly from among the high bidders. Bidders may receive additional
information about the profile of values, beyond knowing the prior distribution.
This information comes in the form of signals that are correlated with the profile of




, where the Si are
measurable spaces and π : V N → ∆ (S) is a measurable mapping from profiles of
values to probability measures over S = ×iN=1Si. The interpretation is that Si is the 
set of bidder i’s signals and π describes the conditional joint distribution of signals 
given values. For a fixed information structure S , the first-price auction is  a game 
of incomplete information, in which bidders’ strategies are measurable mappings 
σi : Si → ∆ (B) from signals to probability measures over bids. A (Bayes Nash) 
equilibrium is a strategy profile σ  =  (σ1, . . . , σN )  such that each b idder’s strategy 
maximizes their ex ante expected surplus, given the strategies of the other bidders.
3. A PURE-COMMON-VALUE EXAMPLE
We will illustrate the main results with a simple example. There are two bidders 
who share a common value for the good, which is uniformly distributed between 
0 and 1. Since we assume there is no reservation price in the auction, the good is 
always allocated, regardless of the particular information structure and equilibrium. 
As both bidders have the same value, all equilibria are socially efficient and result 
in a total surplus of 1/2. There may, however, be variation across information 
structures and equilibria in how this surplus is split between the bidders and the 
seller.
We allow bidders to observe arbitrary and possibly correlated signals about the 
common value. Indeed, at one extreme the bidders’ signals are perfectly correlated, 
so that they have exactly the same information about the value. For example, the 
bidders might have no information beyond the prior, so that they both expect the 
good to be worth 1/2, or the bidders might both observe the true value of the
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good, so that they know the good’s value exactly. In any such case, the bidders
will compete the price up to the interim expected value of the good, which results
in zero bidder surplus and expected revenue of 1/2. These examples illustrate our
later general result that, unless we make additional assumptions about what the
bidders know, a tight upper bound on revenue is the efficient surplus.
When the bidders have private information, the distribution of ex-ante surplus
can be rather different. An important case has been studied by [Engelbrecht-
Wiggans et al. 1983]: bidder 1 observes the true value while the bidder 2 is unin-
formed and observes nothing. In the case of the uniform distribution, the resulting
equilibrium involves bidder 1 bidding v/2 and the uninformed bidder randomizing
uniformly over the interval [0, 1/2]. This equilibrium results in a surplus of 1/6 for
bidder 1, a surplus of 0 for bidder 2, and revenue of 1/3.
What can we say about the outcome of the auction more generally? In the
analysis of [Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. 1983], the informed bidder strictly prefers
his equilibrium bid over any other bid. This suggests that it might be possible to
construct other information structures in which revenue is even lower. Here is one
such construction: The two bidders receive signals s ∈ [0, 1] that are independent
draws from the cumulative distribution F (s) =
√
s, so that the distribution of the
maximum signal is standard uniform, the same as the common value. Moreover,
the signals and the value are correlated so that the maximum signal is exactly equal
to the value:
v = max {s1, s2} . (1)
This information structure admits an equilibrium in which the bidders use the















Thus, the equilibrium bid is the expectation of other bidder’s signal, conditional
on it being below s. We will presently verify that these strategies constitute an
equilibrium, but let us first note the implied welfare outcomes: the winning bid
will always be maxi si/3 = v/3, so that revenue is 1/6. Bidder surplus is therefore
1/3, which is twice as much as the bidders obtained in the proprietary information
model of [Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. 1983]
Let us now verify that these strategies comprise an equilibrium. It is well known
that these strategies are an equilibrium of a slightly different model, in which the
bidders receive the same signals drawn from the same distribution, but in which each
bidder’s signal is their private value. In other words, when there are independent
private values (IPV), the equilibrium bid is the expectation of the other bidder’s
value (i.e., signal) conditional on it being less than one’s own signal [Krishna 2002].1
Now, in our common-value model, a bidder who deviates by bidding s′/3 for some
s′ < s will only win when their own signal was the highest signal, and therefore
equal to the common value. Thus, a downward deviator’s surplus looks exactly the
same as in the as-if IPV setting, and we can immediately conclude that bidders do
1Indeed, this is a necessary consequence of the revenue equivalence between first- and second-price
auctions in the IPV setting.
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not want to deviate down. On the other hand, if a bidder deviates up to s′/3 with
s′ > s, the bidder continues to win on the event that they had the high signal, and
now wins on some events when it was the other bidder who had the high signal,























which is independent of s′. In other words, bidders are exactly indifferent to all
upward deviations!
In fact, no matter how one structures the information or the equilibrium strate-
gies, it is impossible for revenue to fall below the level attained in this example, i.e.,
1/6 is a tight lower bound on revenue when there are two bidders and there is a
pure common value that is standard uniform. Moreover, not only is it impossible for
revenue to fall below the level of the example, but the distribution of winning bids
in any equilibrium under any information structure must first-order stochastically
dominate the winning-bid distribution in the equilibrium we just constructed.
We sketch the argument as follows. Any equilibrium under any information
structure will induce a distribution of the winning bid, which we denote by H(b).
We can further decompose this into a distribution of the winning bid conditional





Let us suppose that the equilibrium is symmetric and that H has no atoms. (These
assumptions are dispensed with in the general argument.) Then all bidders are








Now, fix any bid b, and consider the following deviation for bidder i: whenever the
equilibrium strategy says to bid less than b, bid b, and otherwise bid according to
the equilibrium strategy. We refer to this as a uniform deviation up to b. We claim
that the surplus from this deviation is∫ 1
v=0
(







The reason is that the deviating bidder always bids at least b, so that whenever the
winning bid would have been less than b, the deviator now wins (and by hypothesis
the ex ante probability of a tie at b is zero). On the other hand, if the winning bid
under the equilibrium strategies would have been greater than b, then the outcome
of the auction is unchanged: if the deviator would have won in equilibrium, then
the deviation does not affect his bid, and if he would not have won, any deviation
would be to a bid of b, which is not high enough to win.
Thus, a necessary condition for a winning bid distribution to arise in equilibrium
is that no bidder wants to uniformly deviate up, which is equivalent to∫ 1
(v − b)H(b|v)dv ≤ 1
∫ 1 ∫ b
(v − x)H(dx|v)dv.
v=0 2 v=0 x=0
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Now, consider a distribution H(b) that is the expectation of some conditional dis-
tribution H(b|v) that satisfies these inequalities for all b. We show that the set of
winning bid distributions that can be so induced has a smallest element in the first-
order stochastic dominance ordering, which is equivalent to the pointwise ordering
on H(b). The conditional distribution that attains this minimum is constructed in
a “greedy” manner, whereby lower values are associated with lower winning bids.2
In particular, there is a monotonic winning bid function β(v) so that H(·|v) puts
probability one on β(v). With this additional structure, the incentive constraint
for a uniform upward deviation to β(w) can be rewritten as∫ w
v=0














(v + β(v))dv. (2)
There is a pointwise smallest solution to this functional inequality, which is attained
by a winning bid function β(v) = v/3.3 This winning bid function induces a
distribution of winning bids H that is uniform on [0, 1/3], which is the minimum
winning bid distribution across all information structures and strategy profiles that
satisfy the uniform upward incentive constraints. Since any equilibrium strategy
profile must also satisfy these constraints, H must be below any equilibrium winning
bid distribution. But since this is precisely the winning bid distribution that obtains
with the maximum-of-independent-signals information structure, we know that this
is also the minimum winning bid distribution across all information structures and
equilibria.
Figure 1 shows the possible combinations of bidder surplus (on the x-axis) and
revenue (on the y-axis). As the total surplus is 1/2, and as all equilibrium alloca-
tions are efficient in the pure common value environment, the different allocations
correspond to the −45 degree line on the right of the picture.
Note that at this solution, all of the uniform upward incentive constraints bind,
which implies that in equilibrium, bidders must be indifferent between their equi-
librium bids and all higher bids. Indeed, this was the case in our construction of
an information structure and equilibrium that obtains the bounds. These binding
constraints constraints are illustrated in Figure 2, which depicts indirect utility of
a bidder who mimics the bid of a bidder with type s′ while his true type is s. The
mimicked type is on the x-axis, and we plot the indirect utility for three types,
2Suppose that H(b|v) satisfies the uniform upward incentive constraints and induces a distribution
H(b). Then we can define β(v) = min{b|H(b) ≥ v} to be the bid with the same percentile as
the value, and let H̃(b|v) be the conditional distribution that puts probability one on β(v). It is
readily verified that H̃(b|v) also deters uniform upward deviations.
3Consider the operator Λ that maps a monotonic winning bid function β to the right-hand side of
(2). Then the uniform upward incentive constraint is equivalent to β ≥ Λβ. Λ is also monotonic,
so that iteratively applying Λ to any β that satisfies this inequality generates a decreasing sequence
of functions. Finally, Λ is a contraction of modulus 1/2 (in the sup norm) so that there is a unique
fixed point of Λ which must be below any β that satisfies (2). It is easily verified that β(v) = v/3
is this fixed point.
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Fig. 1. Bidder Surplus and Revenue Across Information Structures
s = 1/4, 1/2, 3/4. The flat segments in to the right of the equilibrium bid (marked
the short vertical line) indicate the bidders’ upward indifference.
4. MAIN RESULT
In [Bergemann et al. 2017a], we generalize the preceding analysis to provide a lower
bound on the winning bid distribution for any distribution of values. In particular,
this includes value distributions in which the bidders have different values. When
Fig. 2. Uniform Upward Incentive Constraints
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the distribution is symmetric, in the sense of exchangeability, then the lower bound
is tight and is in fact the minimum winning bid distribution.
We now give a statement of the general result. The bidders only learn the realized










Let Q denote the distribution of α (v), and write [w,w] for the convex hull of
the support of Q. The bidders receive signals that are independent draws from
a distribution F (s) = (Q (s))1/N on the support S = [w,w]. This distribution is
chosen so that the highest signal is distributed according to Q. Indeed, signals will
be correlated with values so that:
(i) the highest signal is equal to the realized average losing value;
(ii) the bidder with the highest value receives the highest signal.
















which is the expectation of the highest of N − 1 draws from (Q(s))1/N conditional
on it being less than w. The associated winning bid distribution is





For a given information structure S and equilibrium σ, the winning-bid distribution
is defined by:














∣∣∣ s) is the conditional probability that all bids are less than b given
signal profile s. Our main result is the following:
Theorem 4.1 Minimum Winning Bids.
(i) For any information structure S and equilibrium σ, the distribution of winning
bids H (S, σ) first-order stochastically dominates H, i.e., H (b;S, σ) ≤ H (b)
for all b;
(ii) There exists an information structure S and an efficient equilibrium σ such
that the distribution of winning bids H (S, σ) is exactly equal to H.
With a pure common value model, the realized surplus in the first-price auction is
independent of the allocation of the object across the bidder. We now illustrate
our results with independent values drawn from the uniform distribution and two
bidders. By contrast, in the independent private value environment, the surplus
that is generated by the auction now depends on the allocation across the bidders.
Figure 3 illustrates results for this example. As the maximum total surplus is 2/3,
the efficient allocations correspond to the −45 degree line on the right of the picture.
The worst case for efficiency would be that the object is always sold to the bidder




















Fig. 3. The set of revenue-bidder surplus pairs with independent private values.
with the lowest value, which would generate a total surplus of 1/3. Thus, the green 
trapezoid represents the surplus pairs that satisfy this range restriction on total 
surplus and also give non-negative surplus to both the bidders and the seller.
We can again consider the whole range of revenue and bidder surplus across 
all possible information structures and equilibria. This includes, in particular, 
maximum revenue, minimum bidder surplus, and minimum total surplus. In the 
analysis thus far, we have considered all information structures, including those in 
which the bidders’ signals do not reveal their own values exactly. We refer to this 
model as one of unknown values, to distinguish it from the case that we consider 
next. The set of surplus pairs that can arise in the unknown-values model is the 
area enclosed by the blue curve in Figure 3. Point A corresponds to minimum 
revenue/maximum bidder surplus characterized by our main theorem. Point B 
corresponds to maximum revenue/minimum bidder surplus, in which the bidders 
obtain zero surplus but the allocation is efficient, so that the seller obtains all 
of the efficient surplus. In the information structure that attains this point, the 
bidders have relatively precise information about the highest value, but imprecise 
information about who has the highest value. This induces very aggressive bidding 
so that the bidders compete away all their rents, although the information is precise 
enough to facilitate an efficient allocation in which the high-value bidder always wins 
the good. The point C corresponds to minimum total surplus, which, remarkably, 
attains the lower bound of 1/3. This is attained in an information structure and 
equilibrium in which the good is always won by the bidder who values it the least. 
The information and equilibrium are easy to describe: each bidder observes a signal 
equal to the other bidder’s value, and then bids their signal.
In the known-values model, we assume that the bidders at least know their own 
values, and their signals may contain additional information about others’ sig-
nals. The set of welfare outcomes that can arise under known-values information
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structures and equilibria is enclosed by the red curve in Figure 3.4 In contrast to
unknown values, known values implies that each bidder can guarantee himself a
strictly positive surplus, so that maximum revenue attained at point D is strictly
less than the expected highest value, which is 2/3. We fully characterize this out-
come using methods adapted from [Bergemann et al. 2015], which studies the
welfare impact of information in third-degree price discrimination. Point E corre-
sponds to minimum revenue under known values, for which we have an analytical
characterization only when values are binary.
The known-values surplus is significantly smaller than the unknown-values sur-
plus set. It is notable that the inefficiencies that can arise in the known-values
model are relatively small compared to what can happen with unknown values.
This observation is in line with the results of [Syrgkanis and Tardos 2013] and
[Syrgkanis 2014] who show that the efficiency loss in the independent private-value
auction expressed in terms of the ratio between realized surplus and efficient surplus
in the first-price auction is bounded below by 1− 1/e.
5. DISCUSSION
A feature of our analysis is that we characterize bidding behavior in all equilibria for
all information structures at once. [Bergemann and Morris 2013; 2016] show that
the range of such behavior can be described using a certain incomplete-information
correlated equilibrium that they term Bayes correlated equilibrium. Thus, a con-
tribution of ours is to characterize the Bayes correlated equilibria of the first-price
auction.
In the pure-common-value model, the winner’s value and all of the losing bidders’
values are exactly the same, so that the winning-bid-minimizing information struc-
ture can be simply described as the bidders having independent and real-valued
signals and the value being the maximum of the signals. [Bulow and Klemperer
2002] studied a second-price auction where bidders’ information is of this form
and showed that there is an equilibrium in which bidders bid their signals. They
showed that the bidder with the highest signal has the lowest marginal revenue as
described by the standard virtual value, thus hinting at the low revenue properties
of this information structure. In fact, the winner’s curse effect is so strong that
revenue would be higher if the seller simply offered the good at the highest posted
price such that all bidders are willing to accept.
In [Bergemann et al. 2017b], we characterize revenue-maximizing auctions for this
information structure with pure common values. When the good must be sold, the
aforementioned posted price is indeed the optimal mechanism, but more generally
the optimal mechanism has a novel form that we refer to as the priority auction.
This mechanism biases the allocation towards lower-signal bidders conditional on
the good being allocated. In this context, we show that the revenue ranking of
4The fact that the known-values set (in red) is contained within the unknown-values set (in blue) is
a reflection of the general observation that providing the bidders with more information decreases
the set of outcomes that can be rationalized as an equilibrium with even more information. In
other words, the set of Bayes correlated equilibria is decreasing in the minimum information of
the players. [Bergemann and Morris 2016] formalize the notion of “more information” and give a
precise statement of this result.
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[Bulow and Klemperer 1996] between optimal auction with N bidders and standard
auction with N + 1 bidders is reversed in favor of the optimal auction, even when
we allow the standard auction to have N +K bidders for any K > 0.
Our approach can be used to compare the set of possible welfare outcomes across
mechanisms. We have shown that the first-price auction (even without a reserve
price) is guaranteed to generate positive revenue, regardless of the information
structure and equilibrium. This is not true of the second-price auction. Even when
buyers know their own values, the second-price auction admits weakly-dominated
equilibria in which revenue is zero. In [Bergemann et al. 2018], we show more
broadly that the first-price auction must have a weakly greater revenue guarantee
than any other mechanism that is revenue equivalent to the first-price auction when
the environment is one of symmetric and independent private values, which includes
second-price auctions, all-pay auctions, and any combinations thereof. When we
compute a restricted revenue guarantee across just symmetric affiliated environ-
ments and monotonic pure-strategy equilibria, first-price, second-price, and En-
glish auctions all become revenue-guarantee equivalent. Finally, in [Bergemann
et al. 2016] we identify mechanisms that provide the optimal revenue guarantee
when there are two bidders and binary common values, and [Brooks and Du 2018]
characterize revenue-guarantee maximizing auctions in more general common value
settings.
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